Introduction 27
For social enterprises in Scotland delivering social care services through local authority contracts, the 28 introduction of the Social Care (Self-directed Support (SDS)) (Scotland) Act 2013 (henceforth referred 29 to as the Social Care Act) has provided both opportunities and challenges. The policy entrenches the 30 rights of state-funded social care consumers to have choice and control over their own care. Before 31 the policy was implemented in April 2014, social enterprises in Scotland had already begun 32 proactively adapting their services and commercial activities to make their services sustainable in 33 this new personalised market . However, a decade after the first pilot studies 34 of this transformative social care policy, there remains little academic evidence of the experience of 35 social enterprises operating in this personalised social care landscape. This paper therefore responds 36 to this gap by exploring the opportunities and challenges that self-directed care has presented to 37 social enterprises in Scotland. 38 The principles of empowering social care users to direct their own care which are inherent in the 39 Social Care Act have been reported across Europe, Australia, Canada and the USA (e.g. Needham and 40 Dickinson, 2018; Pearson et al, 2018; Power, 2014) . Since the 1990s, policy makers in the UK have 41 increased opportunities for social care users to have greater control over their own care. However, 42 the scope of such personalisation policies has accelerated since the 2008 recession and, while such 43 policies are 'impossible to disagree with' (Pearson and Ridley, 2017, p.1055), the widespread 44 introduction of similar SDS policies across recession-hit countries suggests such policy initiatives were 45 driven at least in part from a political cost-efficiency agenda. 46 Social enterprise is a contested concept (Teasdale, 2012) and in the UK it has been argued to be the 47 latest manifestation of principles already existing within Western social economies and exhibiting 48 practises that date back to the 19 th Century (Sepulveda, 2015) . Since the 2008 recession, social 49 enterprises have become increasingly prominent in the UK's politically-driven austerity agenda as an 50 alternative form of public service delivery (Hazenberg & Hall, 2016) , leading to the suggestion that 51 the UK is undergoing a 'social enterprization' of its' welfare system (Sepulveda, 2015) . Yet in Scotland 52 there remains a lack of evidence from social enterprises themselves to demonstrate whether such a 53 shift is occurring, and whether it is successful. Limited evidence from upstream Scottish public sector 54 stakeholders has shown that anticipated transformative change in the social care market as a result 55 of the Social Care Act has yet to emerge in response to SDS policy (Pearson et al, 2018) , despite social 56 enterprises positioning themselves to exploit the policy . 57
Early anticipation that the Social Care Act's personalised budget system (SDS) would generate social 58
innovation has yet to be academically supported. What little evidence exists is anecdotal and focused 59 only on those organisations that are highly successful (Vickers et al, 2017) . Greater academic 60 understanding of the emergence of social innovation in social enterprise as a result of the Social Care 61
Act is therefore needed, particularly around the influences and interactions between public 62 institutions, social enterprise and Scotland's social care sector quasi-market (Vickers et al, 2017) . This 63 study offers the beginnings of an academic evidence base addressing these multiple gaps in current 64 understanding, and demonstrates the need for a more systematic investigation of social enterprise, 65 social innovation and Scottish self-directed care. It aims to explore the opportunities and challenges 66 that SDS policy has presented to social enterprises in Scotland, using the lens of Historical 67
Intuitionalism to explore whether SDS has enabled or stifled innovation in social enterprises. 68 69 2. Literature Review 70 Social enterprises are market-driven organisations that balance their commercial trade of goods and 71 services with their underpinning social mission to benefit society Gras & 72 Mendoza-Abarca, 2014). The social purpose of social enterprises are wide ranging in the UK, and can 73 include the reduction of inequalities, for example through providing social housing (e.g. Fitzpatrick & 74 Watts, 2017), increasing opportunities for marginalised populations (e.g. Givon, 2017), and providing social services (e.g. Henderson et al, 2018) . In Scotland, social 76 enterprises are supported and promoted by the devolved Scottish Government through a 10-year 77 Government-led Social Enterprise Strategy (Scottish Government, 2016) . The Scottish Social 78 Enterprise Census (Social Value lab, 2017) found Scottish social enterprises '…often fill a market gap 79 that the private sector cannot (profit margins too low and risks too high) or that is beyond the 80 statutory responsibilities of public authorities' (2017, p. 34). The Social Care Act devolved 81 responsibilities for managing care to individuals (reducing the statutory responsibilities of public 82 authorities) in an austerity-led climate of budget cuts and reduced profit margins, leaving the market 83 ripe for social enterprise to fill gaps and generate social innovations in response to demand. 84
SDS budgets and social enterprise 85
The uptake of SDS remains low across Scotland, with a national average uptake of approximately 86 40% (Scottish Government, 2018a), suggesting the market is taking time to mature. Demand for 87 services continues to grow, regardless of whether they are paid for privately or through the welfare 88 system. This demand is driven in large part by an increasingly aged Scottish demographic (Audit 89 Scotland, 2017a) . 90 SDS is a direct payment policy with four options 1 which intends to encourage individuals to exercise 91 more choice and control over their care (Audit Scotland 2017a).The core SDS principles empower 92 people to have choice and control over the services they receive, so it was expected that the social 93 care market would become driven by the needs of the individual consumers rather than dictated by 94 local authority contracts. Consequently, the influence of local authorities on the market would 95 lessen. However somewhat counterintuitively, despite a growing number of social enterprises 96 delivering health and social care, Audit Scotland found that changing from state provision to SDS has 97 in fact generated less choice and control amongst some budget holders, particularly those who don't 98 have personal support from carers (e.g. Personal Assistants, friends or family) and those aged over 99 85 (Audit Scotland, 2017a) . As yet no academic evidence has been gathered to explain the processes 100 that created this unexpected effect. 101 102 2.2 SDS and Social Innovation 103 SDS has created opportunities for social innovation in social care and this has been actively 104 supported by the Scottish Government through the Self-directed Support Innovation Fund. In 2015-105 16 (Year 1) it granted £1.25million to 21 projects, most of which were social enterprises/third sector 106 organisations (Scottish Government, 2015) . Whilst some of these newer social enterprises are 107 offering 'traditional' care services, such as support with household tasks, shopping services, and 108 'meals on wheels', other new social enterprises are also emerging in response to an increased 109 demand from SDS budget-holders for non-traditional activities. These new social enterprises may 110 offer socially innovative activities e.g. language classes to improve cognition amongst people with 111 dementia and daytime discos for older people. Participating in these more innovative activities offers 112 opportunities for increased social connections, physical activity and self-worth (Henderson, 2018) . 113
Evidence of the emergence of social innovation amongst social enterprises delivering social care in 114
Scotland does however continue to be largely anecdotal and focused only on those enterprises that 115 are highly successful (Vickers et al, 2017) . There remains a gap in academic understanding of how 116 social innovation emerges in the public domain, especially in relation to SDS policy, and particularly 117 around the interplay of public institutions, social enterprise and quasi-markets like Scotland's social 118 care sector (Vickers et al, 2017) . 119 120
Historical Institutionalism and social care 121
Third sector organisations have long been involved in supplementing the state's provision of welfare 122 services to vulnerable communities (Esping-Anderson 1990) particularly in times of recession, so it is 123 unsurprising that UK governments have promoted social enterprise as a sustainable socially-driven 124 alternative for the provision of some welfare services Sepulveda, 2015; 125 Featherstone et al., 2012) . This shift to promoting social enterprise as a solution to social need has 126 been both swift and explicit under austerity, leading to some attributing the increased marketization 127 of social care to a neoliberal agenda . The shifting of responsibility away from 128 the state towards the individual through new policies like the Social Care Act has been described as a 129 manifestation of neoliberal ideology (Power, 2014; Ferguson, 2012) . 130
However, a shift from state provision to individual responsibility also requires public authorities to 131 evolve their processes and procedures as they relinquish some control over budgetary decision-132
making. Yet as Historical Institutionalism theory explains, generating change at institutional level is 133 complex as attempts to respond to contextual change in a timely and efficient manner are 134 vulnerable to continually shifting social and political structures (Cappocia, 2016; Thelen, 1999) . 135
Public institutions are fundamentally change-resistant (Pierson, 2000) and designed to remain stable 136 regardless of changes in prevailing politics or policies (Cappocia, 2016). As a result, they will maintain 137 a similar pattern of decision-making and governance that repeats across time, demonstrating path 138 dependence i.e. the persistence of organisational behaviour over time regardless of its efficacy or 139 efficiency (Vergne and Durand, 2011) . Path dependence can impact on quasi-markets like social care 140 because the market is largely governed and operated by public institutions. Pierson (2000) notes 141 '…institutions are hard to change, and they have a tremendous effect on the possibilities for 142 generating sustained economic growth. Individuals and organizations adapt to existing institutions.' 143 (Pierson, 2000, p.256) . Scottish local authorities are therefore embedded in their political and social 144 context, and 'cannot be understood in isolation' (Thelen, 1999, p.384 ). While these institutions may 145 attempt to evolve in response to policies like the Social Care Act, their development is constrained 146 by 'past trajectories' (Thelen, 1999, p.387) . Clients, service providers and markets relying on Scottish 147 local authorities for care services, funding and stewardship of the social care market will therefore 148 adapt to the local authorities requirements. This adaptation might in turn curtail innovation and 149 prevent approaches which challenge the existing operational structure. 150
Historical Institutionalism theory also suggests policies which require institutional change can be 151 ineffective if the timing of their introduction is wrong (Cappocia, 2016; Pierson, 2000) . The 152 introduction of the Social Care Act demanded local authorities change multiple systems to enable 153 clients to be offered choice and control over their own care. However Scottish local authorities were 154 simultaneously enduring significant cuts to their budgets (Audit Scotland, 2017b). In addition, 155 existing procurement legislation meant the Social Care Act was immediately "…in opposition to 156 current procurement practice where the individual's choice would be secondary to the requirement 157 to (re)tender in line with public procurement regulations" (CCPS, 2018; Kettle, 2012) . The timing of 158 the introduction of the policy was therefore made more challenging by the simultaneous cuts to 159 Scottish local authority budgets and a lack of resources to swiftly evolve procurement legislation. 160
Local authorities' role in implementing the Social Care Act 161
Local authorities have been slowly evolving from care providers to managers of social care since the 162 introduction of Direct Payments across the UK in the 1990's. Since the Social Care Act was first 163 proposed, Scottish local authorities, like their UK counterparts, have been forced to rapidly increase 164 their role and responsibilities in co-ordinating public, private and third sector social care providers in 165 the market (Land and Himmelweit, 2010) . 166
Traditionally Scottish social care clients could expect their care package to cover some personal 167 needs e.g. administering medication (known as registered care), and homecare services such as 168 shopping and cleaning. However the implementation of the Social Care Act changed the expectations 169 of social care clients and service providers as individuals were now given a budget which the Scottish 170 Government suggested they could choose to spend on the social care activities they wanted (Scottish 171 Government, 2018b) . However local authorities implementing SDS under austerity had to manage 172 such high expectations and so, following policy implementation, some local authorities began 173 producing lists of 'permitted' or sanctioned activities only which clients could purchase through their 174 SDS budgets. Scottish local authorities are able to exert this control over individual's SDS decision-175 making and spending as, to minimize risk, all services and activities must be approved by the local 176 authority before SDS funds are released. This control over permitted spending in turn impacts upon 177 and differentiates local social care markets across each of Scotland's 32 local authorities, as service 178 providers reliant on SDS payments will therefore adapt (Pierson, 2000) to the local authority's 179 requirements. 180
In the UK, social work departments have traditionally been resourced and managed by local 181 authorities and hence have not been immune to austerity cost-cutting. Personalisation policies 182 across the UK home nations have challenged these social workers to work in new ways with reduced 183 resources to ensure positive outcomes and maintain good practice whilst minimising risk (Stevens et 184 al, 2018) . In Scotland, the timing of the implementation of the Social Care Act has been challenging 185 for social work, and when coupled with 'past trajectories' (Thelen, 1999) , have added to the failure 186 of the policy to generate transformative change in the social care market (Pearson et al, 2018) . 187
The following study aims to explore the opportunities and challenges that SDS has presented to 188 social enterprises in Scotland through examining the experiences of a cohort of social enterprises 189 providing activities and services paid for through clients' SDS budgets. To investigate the influence of 190 local governance systems upon these social enterprises, additional insight is captured through the 191 narratives of public institution stakeholders, social enterprise network representatives, and 192 organisations which advocate for SDS clients. This study then examines the participants' narratives to 193 explore the emergence of social innovation in local care markets. 194 195
Method 196

Sample 197
This study sought the perspectives of a range of stakeholders to give insight into the current social 198 enterprise social care landscape, including nine social enterprise representatives who deliver 199 frontline social care; four public sector representatives from social work, the National Health Service 200 (NHS), and SDS procurement governance; four stakeholders from regional and national third sector 201 social care advocacy organisations; and two social enterprise network stakeholders who are in 202 regular contact with hundreds of social enterprises across Scotland. Participants came from 203 seventeen different organisations and were sampled from seven of the thirty two local authority 204 regions across Scotland including areas in central, western, northern and eastern Scotland. In 205 addition, five stakeholders represented national organisations that worked across all Scottish regions 206 (see Table 1 ). Participants were purposively sampled. Six participants were recruited initially through 207 the research team's professional networks, and through the snowball technique those six 208 participants recruited a further 13 stakeholders. The interviews were open-ended and participant-led, ranging in duration from 45 minutes to 120 223 minutes depending on the individual. Two of the authors conducted the one-one-one interviews. 224
The location of the interview was chosen by each participant, and took place either in University 225 meeting rooms or in the participants' workplace. All participants completed consent forms prior to 226 interview, including indicating whether they gave permission for their interview to be audio-227 recorded. Due to sensitivities around the research topic, four stakeholders did not wish to be audio-228 recorded but still consented to participate in the research. Where interviews were not audio-229 recorded, the researcher took extensive notes of responses during the interview. Ethical approval 230 was granted from the University's Ethics Committee. This 'messy' picture was reported to have arisen from the timing of the Social Care Act's introduction 258 in 2014, when annual significant cuts to Scottish local authority budgets were already challenging 259 service provision: 260 "…they did it at the worst possible time...…(putting) pressure on local authorities to 261 deliver it according to legislation at a point where services would be strapped for 262 cash…because they did it at the same time, it meant that everyone was blaming Self-263 directed Support on cutting budgets which is ridiculous…(had they)…waited until there 264 was money available you could have had a far greater perception of Self-directed 265 Support as something which truly enables people to have a choice." (DR, national 266 disability advocate) 267
The timing of SDS's introduction had generated a tense relationship between social enterprise and 268 frontline social work staff who were responsible for implementing the policy: 269 "…because of the nature of SDS and how it was implemented…local authority staff 270 didn't always take to it from the start because it was a completely different way for 271 them to work…I think there was often a feeling that we were encroaching on what they 272 were doing, rather than working harmoniously alongside them." (AD, social enterprise 273
SDS lead) 274
Social enterprises not only had to negotiate with social work staff but also navigate the local 275 authority procurement system. Local authorities in Scotland maintain a system of allowing only 276 through 'approved providers' to be paid for delivering care. Approved providers are organisations 277 which have been vetted by the local authority and have demonstrated their sustainability e.g. by 278 their age, size and/or turnover. When the Social Care Act was implemented, local authorities often 279 continued to rely on existing approved providers to deliver care to SDS budget-holders. This acted as 280 a barrier to new social enterprise providers entering the market, in particular small new social 281 enterprises that could not meet the sustainability criteria local authorities required: 282 "…amongst the (national network) members, the big issue for them is just they can't get 283 a look in…it's the big care providers in terms of third sector that take…(SDS)…up." (GC, 284 national social enterprise network) 285
Contrary to the suggestion that SDS would give clients' greater choice and control, participants 286 reported that service diversity had decreased since the Social Care Act was implemented. BHA, an 287 urban home care service manager, reported clients were no longer allowed the range of services 288 they had enjoyed under pre-SDS local authority care contracts, such as care workers delivering and 289 putting away food groceries for those clients physically unable to do so themselves. She stated the 290 SDS system had increased the control of the local authority over her clients' care rather than giving 291 her clients more choice and control. However, others suggested this change in service provision was 292 an artefact of austerity-driven financial cuts rather than local authorities' attempts to control 293 spending: 294 "I think the failings would be the lack of resources from central government…they're just 295 not…feeding adequately into the local authority purses to run the services that they 296 need." (SW, social worker) 297 CL, a Community Links worker based in an urban health centre, agreed the cuts were the cause of 298 service reduction. She reported an increase in social exclusion amongst her clients as a result of 299 these financial constraints: 300 "…with people's packages being cut to a minimum one of the first things to go is the 301 social aspect of it. So the people used to get support to go shopping or they would get a 302 kind of respite-type thing where they could go to the pictures one day a week. They're 303 not getting that anymore." (CL, Community Links worker) 304
Money and budget cuts were recurrent themes emphasised by the study's participants. This 305 manifested itself beyond service provision. SW (social worker) stated the local authority social 306 care assessment form did not have the 'deep analysis into…day to day life" necessary to 307 properly assess an individual's care requirements: 308 "…in fact the actual biggest part of the form is usually about the financial bit because 309 that's going into the nitty gritty to see how much the local authority can save if the 310 person's got more savings." (SW, social worker) 311
Local authorities' implementation of the Social Care Act 312
Several participants noted that the size and longevity of social enterprises impacted upon their 313 success when trying to enter the approved provider system in order to access SDS clients. For 314 example, BB managed a large social enterprise (c.£1.5million turnover) which was well-established 315 (>20 years). His organisation had operated in the local social care market before the SDS budget 316 system was implemented, and he reported his organisation already had the business networks, scale 317 and local authority experience to immediately recruit SDS clients. He reported however that his 318 social enterprise was one of just eight approved providers in his local authority area, and that his 319 local authority stipulated that those eight providers could only deliver specific care activities which 320 were pre-determined by the local authority rather than chosen by the SDS budget holders. This was 321 consistent with evidence from other participants who reported local authorities controlled not only 322 the organisations that gained approval, but also the type of activities those organisations delivered, 323 regardless of which SDS Option the budget-holder had selected. BB and other participants stated 324 social care markets in their areas were continuing largely unchanged from before the Social Care Act. 325
For those living in remote Scottish rural areas and islands, there was often no social care provider at 326 all. Where there was some provision, choice was limited. NN, the CEO of a new (<3 years) small 327 social enterprise, operated her organisation in an urban area and was successfully specialising in 328 another social care activity without any full-time staff when she was approached by a family to 329 deliver homecare to a client residing on a remote Scottish island. The potential client had fallen and 330 couldn't be released from hospital without homecare in place but the island had no social care 331 provision. The client's family and the local authority agreed that care was best paid for through an 332 SDS budget. However, the island was frequently cut-off by bad weather, leaving workers stranded 333 for days, and so had proved unattractive to other social care providers. NN's organisation was the 334 only social care provider prepared to operate there. This left the local authority with no choice but to 335 approve this new small social enterprise: 336 "We're not a big large organisation that provides care and that's the mainstay…Just 337 getting around that took a while for them (the local authority) to grasp and release the 338 money to the client. They (the client) needed to get home so I think that sped up the 339 process and released the bed from where they were in hospital….Local authorities say 340 they work with social enterprise, but it's not as simple or straightforward as that." (NN, 341 social enterprise CEO) 342 NN's case study demonstrates that local authorities are able to take the risk and approve new small 343 social enterprises if they so choose, suggesting legislation and internal local authority procedures 344 do not inevitably preclude small new social enterprise from entering the market. 345
SDS and social enterprise-led social innovation 346
The emerging evidence in this study suggested that SDS has both promoted and stifled social 347 innovation, depending on whether the local authority was urban or rural. As NN reported, a rural 348 local authority granted a new small social enterprise approved provider status despite the 349 procurement difficulties. While NN did not interpret the social enterprise's SDS-funded social care 350 delivery as socially innovative, another external stakeholder implied it was: 351 "…the (island) nurse approached me and said…"you should try and develop this service 352 so that you take over the island…there are so many people…(that)…need the 353 support…nobody can get here."…She pulled me aside as though it was something really 354 transformational…" (NN, social enterprise CEO) 355 LCB managed social care service provision in a large (60+staff), well-established (over 20 years) urban 356 social enterprise. Following the loss of their local authority contract to the private sector, the 357 organisation developed socially innovative registered and homecare services for SDS budget-holders 358 which involved matching a named worker to each client in a manner similar to matching befrienders 359 to vulnerable people. Backed by large cash reserves and already advantaged by operating in an 360 affluent urban area, the social enterprise was able to recruit enough private clients to cross-subsidise 361 clients waiting months for SDS payment decisions. However this model was not without its 362 challenges, particularly the unexpected high hidden costs involved in signposting, advocacy and 363 support to ensure clients were able to access their SDS budgets. 364
While LCB reported signposting and advocacy as an unexpected cost, another social enterprise 365 embraced signposting and advocacy as part of their marketing strategy. CO, the Development 366
Manager of a rural social enterprise, explained the organisation's business strategy involved 367 campaigning for a wider interpretation of SDS policy amongst local authority staff, and that this 368 repeated contact had led to the creation of a supportive positive relationship between the social 369 enterprise and the local authority. Two other participants in this study, both of whom were 370 unconnected to CO's social enterprise but knew of its' activities from their national remits across 371 Scotland (GC, national social enterprise network; SW, social work union representative) reported 372 that local authority area as being the most supportive of SDS budget-holders in Scotland. Both GC 373 and SW further stated that this view was based on witnessing an emerging socially innovative local 374 social care market driven by SDS budget-holders there. This new market was successfully offering 375 alternative physical and mental health therapies to SDS budget-holders alongside more traditional 376 care provision. 377 CO reported the local authority's co-operation was a practical solution to recognised gaps in local 378 provision: 379 "So (the local authority), mostly under the Self-directed Support agenda, realised that if 380 you were in a rural area and you chose Option 1, a direct payment to buy in your care 381 and support, there was nothing to buy in. So, they gave…a little bit of money to 382 stimulate small enterprises to start looking at care and support…" CO (social enterprise 383 development manager) 384 CO's organisation also recognised that this interplay of organisational agenda and local opportunity 385 also existed in the social enterprise: 386 "…the fact that there was nothing provided created an opportunity for us, and I don't 387 think we would've got so far so quickly had there been competition or had there been 388
other people doing what we do. When you've got nothing…you've got need…." CO 389 (social enterprise development manager) 390
Other social enterprises reported a very different experience when interacting with their local 391 authority, and that such experiences impacted upon their ability to deliver socially innovative 392 activities. For example, PA's social enterprise activities were cited by national stakeholders and her 393 peers as being socially innovative (e.g. DB, national advocacy; GC, national social enterprise network; 394 NN, social enterprise CEO). However PA (social enterprise CEO) reported that her organisation had to 395 curtail its socially innovative activities to ensure they fitted the local authority's stipulations: 396 "…they (the local authority) don't like you doing anything that doesn't fit their 397 boxes…It's a limited resource…there were younger people that wanted to join us but 398 because my remit was only over-65, they were not allowed to come." (PA, Social 399 enterprise CEO) 400
Parameters on the delivery of PA's social innovation limited its ability to reach the broadest 401 possible number of SDS budget holders. Another barrier to the wider adoption of socially 402 innovative activities was the approved provider system. As demonstrated by BHA (social enterprise 403 service manager) and NN's (social enterprise CEO) case studies, approved provider status was 404 difficult to obtain for new, innovative and small social enterprises. 405 GV, the national procurement stakeholder, reported a potential solution to such constraints is 406 under development, namely a national Scottish approved provider database funded by the Scottish 407 Government. He stated22 of the 32 Scottish local authorities had already agreed to this national 408 procurement framework and more were expected to join. GV suggested the framework will allow 409 SDS budget holders greater choice and control through expanding the pool of approved 410 organisations available to them, including social enterprises. However, whether this database 411 would resolve the issue emerging earlier of service homogeneity or embrace nascent socially 412 innovative activities is unclear. As noted earlier, BHA (social enterprise service manager) and CL 413 (Community Links worker) observed the provision of services was currently homogenised and 414 focused on 'traditional' homecare services in some regions, undermining attempts by innovators 415 like PA (social enterprise CEO) to widen access to new innovative activities. Discussing such 416 constraints led AA (regional social enterprise network manager) to reflect upon the relationship 417 between social enterprise and local authorities: 418 "One of the challenges that I think a number of the social enterprises face, probably a 419 most difficult challenge actually, is not necessarily about direct market competition…but 420 actually in the dealings they have with…the local authority." (AA, social enterprise 421 network manager) 422
This difficulty in managing the relationship between social enterprise and the local authority is 423 explored in more detail in the following section. 424
Social enterprise -the last resort in a 'messy' market? 425
Difficult relationships between local authorities and social enterprises were reported by several 426 stakeholders, including concerns about ongoing access to local authority funding. This made 427 speaking truthfully or making demands of the local authority challenging: 428 "…there are a few organisations that are funded…to support people with SDS and I don't 429 think that they (social enterprises) would be open with them (the local authority) about 430 their concerns or some of the negative stories that they hear because they worry that 431 that will impact on their continued funding." (HP, regional advocacy) 432
A power imbalance was referenced whereby social enterprise providers are viewed as 'less' than the 433 public or private sector providers: 434 "…we (social enterprise) are just at the bottom of the pile…some of them go to us 435 directly because they see they can palm them (difficult clients) off onto us and they 436 don't have to worry anymore. And I think some of them see us as a last resort, or they 437 don't think of us at all." (HC, social enterprise development manager) 438
In addition, HP (regional advocacy) reported an expectation amongst the public sector that social 439 enterprises could deliver services more cheaply or even for free. She noted a failure to appreciate 440 the high level of expertise in social enterprise and the wider third sector, and the public sector's 441 assumption that social enterprise has lower expertise than the private sector. HC supported this: 442 "…I would go and see social workers and…they all thought I was 'just' the third sector 443 volunteer…they kept telling me that they were professional social workers. I never said I 444 was one, but I never said I wasn't. What I said was, "As you are a professional, so am I, 445
and we're sitting here on equal partnership." Now the word got around that I was a 446 social worker…I've never changed that view. I'm not!" (HC, social enterprise 447 development manager) 448 BB (social enterprise manager) reported that his organisation was perceived to be 'a provider of last 449 resort' and he felt this was in part due to the organisation's social mission, which required his 450 enterprise to support all clients, regardless of their vulnerability or the cost of doing so. He stated 451 this commitment to deliver care to everyone that needed it meant his organisation cannot refuse a 452 potential client. BB witnessed private providers 'cherry picking' clients while his social enterprise was 453 being sent particularly difficult clients that other providers had refused or abandoned. This was also 454 noted by AZ (social enterprise CEO), who reported that his highly successful rural social enterprise 455 was invited to work in an urban local authority's area. On arrival the organisation found the provision 456 of services in that area was dominated by the private sector. His social enterprise also became the 457 provider of last resort and was allocated the 'hardest' clients that private providers had either 458 abandoned or refused to take. AZ's organisation's social mission prevented it from refusing any 459 client if it had capacity. This aligned with NN's (social enterprise CEO) experience of providing a 460 service on a remote island, where weather stopped the ferry leaving and the costs of service 461 provision made it unattractive to the private sector: 462 "We need to have the flexibility of allowing a carer to stay if they can't get off the island 463 and somebody else can't swap. That sort of thing is difficult to manage…it also makes it 464 very difficult to recruit because not many people want to lose that freedom of getting 465 home when they want to." (NN, social enterprise CEO) 466
The private sector's reluctance to enter such geographically difficult and hence potentially costly 467 rural areas was clear: 468 "Some of the providers in the central belt and some of the national providers would not 469 come into our area because it's not viable." (AZ, social enterprise CEO) 470
Yet several stakeholders reported that such difficulties did not prevent the private sector from 471 bidding for contracts in those areas. In three rural regions, stakeholders reported examples of 472 private sector organisations that were given contracts for a geographic area only to withdraw 473 provision from unviable areas despite contractual obligations: 474 "…his health condition was deteriorating, and the family had been assessed by social 475 work and were waiting for six months for support to come in…There was a contract to 476 provide homecare in that area but the contractor had no staff for that area and were 477 unwilling to send someone out..." CO (social enterprise development manager) 478 CO reported that in remote areas in her region, clients were being given an SDS Option 1 budget to 479 control and purchase their own care despite none being available. This effectively removed any 480 legislative responsibility of the local authority to ensure the client had adequate social care 481 provision. HC (social enterprise development manager) also reported the SDS system was used in 482 this way in her region. In both these areas, the finance for a social care market was made available 483 by the respective local authorities for those particular remote rural sub-areas CO and HC cited, but 484 there was no provider to exploit that. 485 A circular problem in the relationship between the local authority and social enterprise emerged in 486 the narratives of rural social enterprises that successfully delivered social care through SDS budgets 487 in areas where previously no social care had been available. This new provision inadvertently created 488 an unexpectedly high local demand for the new services, as a new client group of individual residents 489 emerged that urgently required care but who had not previously presented their needs to the local 490 authority. The consequence of these pressures was difficult relationships between the social 491 enterprise sector and their respective local authority in some areas: 492 "…(the local authority was)…trying to get people out of hospitals, so they delayed 493 discharges and they were contacting (social enterprises) who were unable to take them 494 on. The (local authority)…were implying that (social enterprises) were responsible for the 495 delayed discharge because of their delays in recruiting enough workers." (HP, advocacy 496 network) 497
One new social enterprise was struggling to cope with its' success in the face of the unexpected 498 demands from previously-unknown residents, combined with the urgent care demands of those 499 about to be discharged from hospital: : 500 "They've done an amazing job…everybody sees them as the answer…It (the social 501 enterprise) could end up folding because it's just too much. Or getting a bad reputation 502 because they won't be able to keep up within what they're given. And I think that would 503 be a real shame, because…they are very good." (HP, advocacy network) 504 HC (social enterprise development manager) suggested that local authorities attempted to transfer 505 both responsibility and blame to the social enterprise sector: 506 "They're (the local authority) seen as the baddies because they can't provide it, (so they 507 say) "If we give it to (social enterprise) it's (their) problem and it's down to them!" (HC, 508
Advocacy/SE development manager) 509
Despite these tensions, one national stakeholder was particularly optimistic that the landscape was 510 changing for the better: 511 "…you have a mixed market. You have third sector provision. You have big 512 organisational provision down to very, very local provision…that segmentation I think 513 has made the social care market…much more powerful and much more responsive to 514 individual need…I think that provides a fertile landscape for a social innovation or a 515 social innovator." (DQ, national disability advocacy) 516 DQ's enthusiastic optimism was not shared by the majority of participants, particularly those 517 working in the frontline of social care, who reported concerns about the sustainability of social care 518 in Scotland. HC held a particularly bleak belief about the current Scottish social care market's 519 sustainability: 520 "…if I really want to be honest, I think euthanasia will come in and that will be the way 521 to solve it….I don't see how they can do it any other way." (HC, social enterprise 522 development manager) 523
Discussion 524
This study explored the experiences of social enterprises delivering social care in Scotland, and found 525 mixed evidence of transformation in the Scottish social care market. The Social Care Act has led to 526 increased opportunities and greater organisational sustainability for some social enterprises, but for 527 others it has created fragmented regional social care markets and maintained the ongoing tense 528 relationships with local authority and public sector staff. While there is some evidence of social 529 enterprise-led transformation in the market, e.g. new social care provision where previously there 530 was none, it is not transforming at the pace or with the consistency across geographic regions 531 anticipated by the Scottish social enterprise social care sector. 532
Explanations for the delay in transformation comes in part from barriers to social enterprises' market 533 inclusion, including size and scale precluding approved provider status, and an attitude in the public 534 sector that social enterprise care providers are somehow 'less' specialised or skilled than other 535 organisational forms. These attributions, and the misconception that social enterprises can deliver 536 services free or more cheaply, were found to undermine the place and importance of social 537 enterprise in the market, regardless of the promoted and well-publicised political enthusiasm 538 supporting social enterprise in Scotland (Scottish Government, 2016 ). Yet despite such 539 misperceptions, some rural Scottish local authorities were found to rely entirely on social enterprises 540 to deliver social care in difficult-to-reach areas and to small, isolated communities, while some urban 541 local authorities allocated social enterprises difficult clients who had been rejected by private sector 542
providers. 543
Under the Social Care Act, the SDS budget system offered new opportunities for clients to gain 544 control of their care budgets and make greater choices over their care and support, and evidence of 545 this occurring emerged in this study. However, there was also strong evidence of local authorities 546 controlling social care provision to people who received SDS through their management of the 547 approved provider process. This in turn hampered social innovation in the market. 548
The timing of the Social Care Act was recognised elsewhere as challenging due to budget cuts in local 549 authorities (e.g. Stevens et al, 2018) , and in this study social enterprise staff and other frontline and 550 strategic stakeholders highlighted the impact of fiscal constraints on the social care market. 551
However, one local authority used the opportunity presented by the new policy to reduce its role in 552 the market, freeing organisations to develop activities which responded to local needs. More 553 commonly, local authorities remained faithful to traditional types of social care services like 554 homecare, manifesting their change-resistant path dependence (Pierson, 2000) . This is consistent 555 with previous evaluation evidence that concluded changing from state provision to individual 556 budgets through the SDS system was generating less choice and control amongst some budget 557 holders (Audit Scotland, 2017a). Drawing on a lens of Historical Institutionalism helps us to 558 understand how local authorities may be slow to change and adapt to new circumstances and 559 policies even under favourable conditions, and instead remain biased towards 'past trajectories' 560 (Thelen, 1999) . 561
The national procurement framework is still under development but offers the potential to remove 562 some barriers to social enterprises' involvement in the social care market through its nationalising of 563 the approved provider process. Should this happen, social enterprise could play an important role in 564 transforming the social care market through providing services that address local needs, developing 565 social innovations, and harnessing the power of local volunteers. The introduction of the national 566 procurement framework could act as a systemic 'shock' to current local authority processes and 567 circumvent the ordinarily slow pace of institutional change identified by Historical Institutionalism 568 theory (Cappocia, 2016) . 569
This study extends theoretical understandings of how social innovation emerges in the public domain 570 and the interplay of public institutions, social enterprise and quasi-markets like Scotland's social care 571 sector (Vickers et al, 2017) . The findings demonstrate that where there are already existing gaps in 572 social care provision, then a change in policy, in this case the Social Care Act, can combine with other 573 contextual factors i.e. austerity and increasing demand, to generate an internal shift in a local 574 authority's historic approach to the provision of social care. This was particularly well-evidenced in 575 one region where a social enterprise worked closely with their local authority to co-produce a new 576 social care quasi-market. The local authority supported social enterprise and small providers as the 577 solution to pre-existing need in the area following proactive campaigning by local social enterprises 578 at a time when social care needs in that area could no longer be met by the local authority, and the 579 local authority was aware some communities in the region were without any social care provision. 580
The introduction of the Social Care Act presented a timely opportunity to interpret the policy and 581 use its associated budgetary innovation (SDS) to achieve better social care coverage. The absence of 582 any competitive market therefore created a vacuum which became a landscape of opportunity. 583 Contextual factors i.e. policy change, new budgetary systems, fiscal constraints, emerging social 584 enterprise advocates, the absence of a competitive market) combined to drive a shift in the local 585 authority's procurement and approval process, resulting in the emergence of socially innovative 586 social enterprise structures, activities, and social care provision. 587
In other regions, however, social enterprises reported that they did not have the relationship with 588 their local authority to enable them to work together to co-produce the local social care quasi-589 market. This was regardless of the success or failure of social enterprise providers operating within 590 those regions, as demonstrated by the very successful social enterprise that was at risk of failing 591 through overwhelming demand. 592
This study found evidence that some staff in local authorities and the public sector viewed social 593 enterprises as 'providers of last resort'. This misperception supports uneven competition in the 594 marketplace, enabling the private sector to continue to 'cream' off easier and hence less costly 595 clients to maximise their profits whilst more difficult clients were 'parked' (Carter and Whitworth, 596 2015) . Due to the commitment to the organisation's social mission, social enterprises in this study 597 reported they could not refuse even the most difficult clients. In this study, these less 'attractive' 598 clients were those that cost the organisation more due to travel and logistics, and clients who had 599 complex needs (e.g. addiction issues; chaotic lives). This phenomenon of 'creaming' has long been 600 evidenced across a number of quasi-markets, from prisons (e.g. Johnston, 1990) to welfare-to-work 601 (e.g. Carter and Whitworth, 2015) . In social care, the refusal of some profit-driven private sector 602 organisations to refuse services to some clients, despite being contracted to do so, raises pressing 603 questions about the governance of the social care quasi-markets in Scotland, and presents a valid 604 concern about human rights to policymakers. 605
The stakeholders' perception that local authorities' view social enterprises as 'providers of last 606 resort' requires further exploration, as does the 'scapegoating' of social enterprise for wider market 607 failures. Poor relationships and lack of co-operation between social enterprises and their local 608 authorities was evident in some regions, allowing scapegoating to flourish. Co-operation between 609 local authorities and social enterprise is essential to transforming and innovating the social care 610 market. National and international policymakers must therefore recognise and support such co-611 operation while being mindful of the wider context surrounding policy implementation, and ensure 612 they surmount legislative barriers within any involved institutions and departments before the policy 613 is introduced. 614 615
Conclusion 616
This study found that the Scottish personalised social care market is 'messy', and a lack of consistent 617 approaches to the implementation of the Social Care Act was evident across Scottish regions. Local 618 authorities were found to largely constrain their social care markets through controlling the choices 619 individuals could make over their care, including the types of activities they could purchase and the 620 types of organisations they could purchase them from. Such constraint was found to be an artefact 621 of both existing procurement legislation and internal local authority change-resistance. This 622 resistance to change also hampered social innovation and the growth of small, new social enterprise 623 entrants. While the timing of the introduction of the Social Care Act and the pressures of austerity 624 did little to support local authorities to consistently implement the policy, it could not explain local 625 authorities' failure to recognise the added value and expertise social enterprises could bring to the 626 social care sector The findings presented here are of relevance to policymakers nationally and 627 internationally, as they offer an increased understanding of emerging social care markets arising 628 from policy-shifts towards empowering social care users to self-direct their care. 629
This study is limited to the views of a purposively selected group of people currently engaged in 630 social care in Scotland who have an interest in social enterprise, itself a contested concept (Teasdale, 631 2012) . A larger systematic investigation with a broader range of stakeholders is urgently needed to 632 give greater insight into the range of issues presented here, including the ongoing lack of social care 633 provision in some areas; the local authority governance of social care quasi-markets; the relationship 634 between local authorities and the social enterprise sector; the lack of personal choice over care; and 635 the constraint on social innovation through an overdependence on historic processes and traditional 636 care activities. 637 
